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REVIEW 
 
FLUORESCENT APORETICS 
 
Nicholas Rescher, Aporetics: Rational Deliberation in the Face of 
Inconsistency. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 2009. 
Pp. 161. £26.50 HB. 
 
By Peter Vickers 
 
How should we proceed if we find ourselves with good reason to believe conflicting 
theses? We have all been in such a position at one time or another. Such conflicts 
immediately call for resolution, and we feel compelled to reject one or another 
assumption as soon as possible. Often such a conflicting set of beliefs isn’t merely 
annoying, but actually dictates that we should carry out two contrary actions. For 
example, depending on what assumption we reject, we might turn left or right at a T-
junction. Relevant situations crop up everywhere; for a soldier, such a decision might 
well be a matter of life and death (there is good reason to believe the map, but also 
good reason to believe the guide: what to do?). And there are many famous examples 
in the history of science, where the decision can affect our vision of how the world 
works, which explanations and predictions we infer, and even how we should build 
instruments and conduct experiments. 
 With his latest book Aporetics, Nicholas Rescher puts forward a suggestion for how 
we should reason in such situations. He describes a set of ‘individually plausible but 
collectively incompatible theses’ as an ‘apory’ (p.1), and spends the majority of the 
book considering different types of apory that can crop up, and how we should proceed 
in these cases. Crucially, his goal is not to guarantee ‘the truth’, but rather to 
‘maximize plausibility’ (p.3). The truth may be preferable, but in cases where the truth 
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eludes us (possibly forever) one need not be forever stumped. Rescher provides us with 
good reasons (in many cases, at least) to proceed in one way rather than another. 
 The central problem in reasoning with inconsistent assumptions is that, by the rules 
of classical logic, one can derive any conclusion one wishes, and no conclusion has 
priority. Since the 1950s an increasing number of philosophers have opted for one or 
another paraconsistent approach, where the rules of logic are changed to avoid this 
awkward result. Rescher is strongly opposed to such a ‘logic-driven’ solution. Instead 
he favours what John Norton has dubbed a ‘content-driven’ approach, where one 
decides how best to proceed by considering the material content of the assumptions in 
question. Rescher’s particular version of this approach is to apply one of several rules 
of thumb when faced with inconsistency. One rule to which Rescher returns on several 
occasions is the ‘Principle of the Conservation of Information’ (p.82). This dictates 
(for example) that one should favour more general claims over more specific claims if 
one can, since if we reject a specific claim we reject one thing, but if we reject a 
general claim we implicitly reject many specific things too (all those which fall under 
the general claim). However, which rules should be favoured depends upon the context 
of enquiry. Sometimes the ‘weakest link’ in an inconsistent set will be a general claim, 
because sometimes (eg. in the context of empirical enquiry) what matters most is how 
much evidence we have for our claims, and general claims are usually more 
speculative than specific claims. A particularly nice example on p.46 shows us how the 
rule to be applied changes depending on whether we are considering a factual 
conditional (‘Since John is not a bigamist…’) or a counterfactual conditional (‘If John 
were not a bigamist…’). Finally, in certain contexts, one should decide what to 
prioritise based not on evidence or ‘conservation of information’, but on 
‘coherence/systematicity’ considerations (pp.133-134). On p.136 the main lessons of 
the book are summarised in table form: the rules of aporetic reasoning which should be 
applied in various different contexts of enquiry are listed. As Rescher puts it, 
‘[W]eakest link determination functions rather differently in different areas of inquiry.’ 
(p.41). 
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 One notices early on in the book that apories often differ markedly from ‘genuine 
paradoxes’. It is immediately obvious in many of the cases that nobody in their right 
mind would accept all of the inconsistent assumptions in play. For example, Rescher’s 
first apory (p.2) consists of four assumptions: (i) the stick looks bent, (ii) things are as 
they look, (iii) the stick feels straight, (iv) things are as they feel. From these 
assumptions one can straightforwardly infer the contradiction that the stick is both bent 
and not bent. But, quite obviously, anyone would reject (ii), and say instead that things 
are usually as they look. Assumption (ii) does not seem to be even individually 
plausible, which raises the question of whether this example should be called an 
‘apory’ at all. And the book is littered with similar examples. 
However, this may well be a pedagogical tool. Instead of being stuck with difficult 
paradoxes and asking what the best ‘way out’ is, with examples like that of the bent 
stick we can see immediately how best to resolve the inconsistency, and go on to ask 
general questions about why that is the best way out. The lessons learnt from such easy 
cases might then be applicable to ‘real paradoxes’ (which are themselves a type of 
apory). But if this is an intention Rescher does not explicitly state it; instead he 
explains his approach in a different way. He argues that we don’t always believe the 
assumptions we ‘entertain’ (p.27) and reason with, taken literally, but we nevertheless 
act upon such assumptions. For example, although we believe ‘things are usually as 
they look’, we actually act out our lives on the assumption that ‘things are as they 
look’. Fred Muller (‘Inconsistency in Classical Electrodynamics?’, 2007) has recently 
made a similar claim in the context of theoretical physics: physicists use equations all 
the time with equals signs where what they really believe would use approximately-
equals signs. The reason is that equations become essentially useless when 
approximately-equals signs are used, because we can no longer tell what follows from 
them. Scientists act as if the equations are true, even though they often don’t consider 
them to be the best candidates for truth. 
 However, there are many cases where we find that the things we actually do want to 
believe (and not just ‘entertain’) are inconsistent. In the end it is frustrating that no 
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current, genuine paradoxes are considered in any detail in the book. The reader is given 
example after example of ‘quasi’ paradoxes, where the way out of inconsistency is 
immediately obvious. But there is no extended discussion of a real-life paradox, 
presented to the reader as genuinely cognitively frustrating, and then submitted to 
‘aporetic reasoning’. I for one would very much like to have seen Newcomb’s Paradox, 
or The Surprise Test Paradox, or the Paradox of Musical Works carefully tackled. A 
2
nd
 edition of the book would benefit greatly from a new chapter consisting of an 
extended case study. 
 However, there are already hints within the book that Rescher’s approach, at least at 
its current level of explication, would not be especially helpful for such genuine “live” 
paradoxes. On pp.43-44 we are introduced to an apory where ‘there is no weakest link’. 
In other words, Rescher accepts that sometimes we can’t decide how to proceed, even 
using his rules of thumb. On p.95 this conclusion is described as a ‘disjunctive 
resolution’: we should simply conclude “This or this or this or … should be 
abandoned”, which is of course useless if a decision has to be made. And it seems that 
there is plenty of scope for interpreting the rules in different ways. On pp.93-94 
another example makes clear the difficulties of deciding which propositions ‘have 
priority’. Rescher notes in footnote 7 that a theist and an atheist would have very 
different takes on how to diffuse the ‘paradox of evil’. And on p.118 he writes that 
‘rival “schools” resolve an aporetic cluster in different and discordant ways… 
Alternative positions make different priorities.’ But then there seems to be a conflict 
between aporetic reasoning as a prescription, a way to proceed in the face of 
inconsistency, and accepting that different people who apply aporetics will proceed in 
different ways. 
 The tension is resolved if one accepts that aporetic reasoning is not always intended 
to provide a single way forward, but merely to help different people decide how they 
want to proceed (depending, perhaps, on their background beliefs). However, it is then 
in danger of becoming a rather empty prescription. Faced with a dilemma we will not 
be able to come to an agreement with others, but will merely (at best) be able to decide 
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how we want to proceed (and even that is not guaranteed). In addition, despite the 
somewhat ambiguous nature of aporetics, there are sometimes exceptions to the rules. 
On pp.47-48 Rescher considers a case where the obvious way forward goes against the 
recommended rule. It’s an open question whether there are many cases looming where 
the favoured rule would lead us astray. 
 However, despite these criticisms, there is much that I admire in the book. It is 
extremely rich, containing much which might inspire others to expand upon the ideas, 
and potentially answer the concerns noted above. The sheer number of examples of 
‘apories’ is an important resource for research in this area, and the general content-
driven (as opposed to logic-driven) approach is surely correct (although it is 
unfortunate that no reference is made to the previous content-driven approaches of 
John Norton and in particular Joel Smith). 
 Aporetics is to be praised for striking the right balance between prescribing general 
reasoning techniques, and insisting that there will always be considerations specific to 
the particulars of an individual case. It does not attempt to provide a succinct ‘theory of 
inconsistency’, and that is exactly right: unlike many articles, it respects the 
complexity and diversity of inconsistencies. Without doubt, it is a valuable addition to 
the literature. 
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